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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 000501

SIPDIS

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PK](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#)
SUBJECT: NWFP: TNSM,S ONE-SIDED "MEDIATION"

REF: A. PESHAWAR 0042
[¶](#)B. 08 PESHAWAR 0326

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b), (d).

Summary

[¶](#)1. (C) Jamal Nasir, Special Assistant to the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) Home Secretary, confirmed to post on March 5 that Tehrik-i Nifaz-I Shariati Muhammadi (TNSM) leader Sufi Mohammad had presented the government with a list of 17 demands. The list, which circulated widely in the local press, included items such as banning music centers and "vulgar CDs" and action against women involved in "immoral activities." Separately, Awami National Party,s (ANP) deputy leader and Senator-elect Afrasiab Khattak told PO and Islamabad Political Counselor on March 5 that the list had not been approved and indicated that the government was unlikely to do so. TNSM,s latest demands follows Sufi,s recent announcement of a March 16 "deadline" for the government to implement Shari,a law. The absence of any conditions on Tehrik-i Taliban (TTP) is telling and one more indicator of the one-sided nature of Sufi,s "mediation" between the government and TTP. End Summary.

TNSM,s 17 Demands

[¶](#)2. (C) Jamal Nasir, Special Assistant to the NWFP Home Secretary, confirmed to post on March 5 that TNSM had presented a list of 17 demands. The list was to be forwarded to Peshawar for approval. Nasir, who participated in the failed 2008 Swat peace deal, played a behind the scenes role this time around. (Note: The Home Department is primarily charged with coordinating law and order functions in the Northwest Frontier Province. Nasir reports to the Chief Secretary. End note.)

[¶](#)3. (U) The published text of the demands appeared in the local press on March 5 as follows:

- Act against drug dealers
- Campaign against obscenity and vulgarity
- Ban music centers and vulgar CDs
- Close markets/shops during prayer time
- Remove women involved in immoral activities

-- Act against profiteers and hoarders
-- Create awareness among people against social evils
-- Dispose quickly of public complaints
-- Set up rehabilitation centers for drug addicts
-- Make arrangements for Qu'ranic teachings and reforms in jails
-- Campaign against bribery
-- Unite ulema from all schools of thought to work against sectarianism (Note: Ulema is the body of Muslim legal scholars. End note.)
-- Take steps to restore the public's confidence in the police
-- Look after the rights of employees and employers
-- Expel corrupt and immoral police officials
-- Install complaint boxes outside the offices of administrative officials
-- Give women the right of property inheritance

Agreement A "Facade"

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¶4. (C) Nasir said despite the pullback of some militant check points around Mingora and the army's departure from Mullah Fazullah's former headquarters at Imam Dheri, Swat, the agreement was a "facade" for both parties. He noted that the agreement was not significantly different from the spring 2008 deal, and the results would be similar -- failure after a few months. For the militants, Nasir remarked, Shari, a law and these latest demands masked the only thing the militants want -- power.

¶5. (C) Although the government's pledge to implement the Nizam-i-Adl (Shari, a) Regulation was aimed at removing this as a propaganda issue for the militants, Nasir commented that many believe that Sufi does not have sufficient influence over his son-in-law Fazlullah or other militants to keep the agreement intact for very long (ref. B). Recent incidents of killings and kidnappings were additional evidence that the agreement would not last long (ref. A). When asked what the government would do once the agreement failed he simply said "the army is still there."

¶6. (C) Nasir pointed out that several of TNSM's demands were not needed or had been practiced for many years. For example Qu'ranic teaching in prisons, according to Nasir, was already practiced throughout Pakistan, a practice that he compared to the U.S. system of allowing priests or pastors into U.S. confinement facilities. Referring to the provision calling for the installation of complaint boxes, he stated there already was a complaint committee with multi-party representation that made the provision unnecessary.

Resource Issues

¶7. (C) Nasir said resource issues were a hurdle for the government to overcome in trying to make the agreement work even in the short term. He expected that neither the federal government nor the NWFP would provide the significant funding needed to expand the court system in order to implement speedy court actions called for by the provision of "quick disposal of public complaints." He said that no timeline for establishment of additional courts had been made nor had a

process begun to make such a determination.

Pessimism Shared by Ordinary Citizens from Swat

¶8. (C) Nasir,s pessimism concerning the likely collapse of the Swat deal was echoed by a range of non-governmental post contacts associated with Swat. All expressed the expectation that the agreement would not last long and feared the collateral damage that the military would cause when the conflict resumed. Three mentioned their apprehension based on pronouncements made from the militant,s FM radio stations concerning the closing of girl,s schools, despite press statements by local officials that they would be reopened. Several mentioned that few internally displaced persons (IDP) were returning to Swat. (Note: Many of Swat,s IDPs are displaced within the valley, staying with family and friends.)

Comment

¶9. (C) TNSM,s latest demands follows Sufi,s recent announcement of a March 16 "deadline" for the government to implement Shari,a law. Two army personnel were reportedly killed on the day TNSM published its demands. The absence of any conditions on Tehrik-i Taliban (TTP) is telling and one more indicator of the one-sided nature of Sufi,s "mediation" between the government and TTP. Despite private expressions of exasperation with Sufi and behind the scenes acknowledgement from some senior officials that the deal/ceasefire won,t last, the provincial and federal governments, the Army, the NWFP police and the media continue to publicly claim that the agreement with TNSM is a good one that has stopped the violence and has the potential to bring peace to the Swat valley.

PATTERSON